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CHAPTER 21 
Administration of Justice 
ALAN J. DIMOND 
§21.l. General; The 1959 SURVEY year saw no significant structural 
or administrative changes in the Massachusetts judicial system. Ju-
dicial administration continued to be generally efficient and able to 
meet current demands within the existing framework and procedures 
with more than adequate results.1 
A. THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
§21.2. Business of the Court. Between September I, 1958, and 
August 31, 1959, the full bench of the Supreme Judicial Court decided 
292 cases, against 268 for the preceding year and 254 and 248 for the 
years next preceding. The Court also rendered one advisory opinion. 
All cases argued or submitted before the end of June, 1959, were de-
cided before the summer recess, 49 cases being disposed of by rescripts 
without opinions. 
Of the 292 full bench cases, 235 (81 percent) were briefed and argued 
by both sides, ,33 (llpercent) were briefed and argued by only one 
side, the other side submitting on its brief or not appearing, and 24 
(8 percent) were submitted on brief by one or both sides but not argued 
by either. The decision of the lower court was affirmed in 159 cases 
(54 percent), affirmed with modification in 8 cases (3 percent) and re-
versed in 94 cases (32 percent). Thirty-one cases (11 percent) came up 
on report without decision by the lower court. 
The average time between the entry of a full bench case in the Su-
preme Judicial Court and the consultation of the Justices was 123 days, 
from consultation to decision 63 days, or a total time of 186 days be-
tween entry and decision. 
§21.3. Superintendence of the lower courts. One of the chief re-
sults of the work of the Judicial Survey Commission in 1956 was the 
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§21.1. 1 Statistics used in this chapter have been obtained from the offices of John 
A. Daly, Esquire, Executive Secretary to the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, 
Chief Justice Paul C. Reardon of the Superior Court, and Hon. Kenneth L. Nash, 
Chairman of the Administrative Committee of the District Court~. 
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enlargement of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Judicial Court by con-
ferring upon it "general superintendence of the administration of all 
courts of inferior jurisdiction." 1 The first case involving this provi-
sion and certain allied clauses was presented in 1959 in County Com-
missioners of the County of Bristol v. The Judges of Probate of the 
County of Bristol.2 This was a bill for declaratory relief brought in 
the Supreme Judicial Court and heard upon a stipulation to deter-
mine rights to the use of a courtroom built and financed by the Bristol 
county commissioners under special legislation passed in 1950 and 
1951 providing, among other things, for a Probate Court courtroom 
as part of an addition to the "Superior Court building" in New Bed-
ford. For many years before the erection of the addition, the county 
commissioners had managed and controlled the courthouse and had as-
signed its rooms. They claimed like authority over the addition and 
sought to assign the new courtroom at various times to the use of the 
Superior Court. The probate judges, on the other hand, objected to 
certain of these assignments, claiming that the commisioners' authority 
over the new courtroom was subject to the determination of the pro-
bate judges that the room was not needed for the business of the Pro-
bate Court. 
Treating the controversy as essentially a dispute between the Su-
perior Court and the local Probate Court, the Supreme Judicial Court 
drew on its new source of administrative power under the legislation of 
1956 and declared that the ultimate power as to the use of the court-
room was in neither the county commissioners nor the probate judges 
but rather in the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court. Since, how-
ever, there was no issue presented respecting the use of the courtroom 
on any specific future date, the high court merely declared its pos-
session of the ultimate power over the use of the courtroom and re-
frained, temporarily at least, from entering further into what was es-
sentially a family quarrel. With a declaration of its readiness to assign 
dates for use of the courtroom if another conflict arose, the Supreme 
Judicial Court expressed the "hope that a reasonable spirit of co-
operation will resolve any future question of the sort." 
B. THE SUPERIOR COURT 
§2I.4. Centennial. Augmented by eight additional justices, seven 
of whom were in office during most of the 1959 SURVEY year, the Su-
perior Court became one hundred years old on July 2, 1959, and ob-
served its centennial on Law Day, May I, 1959, with a reception by 
Governor Furcolo in the Hall of Flags, a Senate-House convocation in 
the House chamber, followed by a luncheon and then a banquet in the 
evening. Subsequently exercises were also held in the various counties. 
§2l.!l. 1 Acts of 1956. c. 707. §1. amending C.L.. c. 211. §3. 
2338 Mass. 738. 157 N.E.2d 245 (1959). 
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§21.5. Business of the court. The Superior Court, for the third 
successive year, continued to keep ahead of its new business by again 
reducing its inherited backlog, as the following table shows. 
TABLE I 
Superior Court Business 
1955·56 1956·57 1957·58 1958·59 
. Undisposed of cases be· 
I ginning of year 66,483 68,739 61,681 56,974 
Entries during year 31,586 35,619 39,030 3iJ,883 
Dispositions during year 32,923 42,209 43,660 42,455 
Undisposed of cases end 
of year 67,529 59,673 56,972 51,783 
Undisposed of law cases 
end of year 61,105 52,356 49,185 43,765 
Remaining triable law '""'-
docket end of year 48,702 40,473 36,267 30,294 \ 
The interval between entry and trial in the regular course of jury 
cases achieved stability in most counties near the one year mark. The 
losses in 1959 in counties such as Barnstable, Berkshire and Hampden 
are attributable 'to the statutory priority given to a large number of 
eminent domain cases which were p1aced at the head of the docket. 
The following table shows conditions as of July 1 for the past three 
years. 
TABLE II 
Average Number 'of Months Interval Between 
Entry and Trial of Jury Cases 
July 1, 1957 July 1, 1958 July 1,1959 
Barnstable 
Original 24 20 29 
, Removed 20 9 10 
Berkshire 
Original 29 9 21 
Removed 30 9 21 
Bristol 
Taunton 
Original 20 8 9 
Removed 20 10 II 
New Bedford 
Original 21 18 11 
Removed 20 18 II 
Fall River 
Original 24 12 12 
Removed 21i 12 7 
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july 1, 1957 july 1, 1958 july 1,1959 
Essex 
Salem 
Original 15 12 14 
Removed 17 9 14 
Lawrence 
Original 18 12 15 
Removed 20 12 16 
Newburyport 
Original 6 6 9 
Removed 6 6 9 
Franklin 
Original 7 8 8 
Removed 9 4 13 
Hampden 
Original 16 9 11 
Removed 131 9 11 
Hampshire 
Original 10 10 11 
Removed 10 6 7 
Middlesex 
Cambridge 
Original 31 23 16 
Removed 26 11 12 
Lowell 
Original 24 16 14 
Removed 26 7 12 
Norfolk 
Original 15 12 13 
Removed 19 12 14 
Plymouth 
Plymouth 
Original 7 11 12 
Removed 9! 10 11 
Brockton 
Original 10 10 12 
Removed 11 11 11 
Suffolk l 
Original 30 12 12 
Removed 15 12 11 
Worcester 
Worcester 
Original 11 9 10 
Removed 13 11 11 
Fitchburg 
Original 28 12 19 
Removed 29! 12 22 
§21.5. 1 In Suffolk County, the category of removed cases seems to include only 
motor vehicle torts. These torts, however, make up the bulk of removals. 
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A valuable source of temporary manpower for the Superior Court 
has been provided by District Court judges assigned to sit on motor 
tort and misdemeanor cases in the Superior Court. The contribution 
of these judges is shown in the following table. 
TABLE III 
Number of Days That District Court Judges 
Sat in the Superior Court 
Motor tort 
Criminal 
Totals 
1955-56 
558 
558 
1956-57 
1,411 
537 
1,948 
1957·58 
2,068 
600 
2,668 
1958-59 
1,087 
603 
1,690 
Because of the refusal of the 1959 legislature to provide funds to 
compensate District Court judges for their Superior Court service, Dis-
trict Court judges will not sit in the Superior Court during the 1960 
SURVEY year unless funds are appropriated promptly upon the con-
vening of the 1960 legislature. 
§21.6. The Transfer Act. As the result of the Transfer Act,l which 
became effective on September I, 1958, the Superior Court was author-
ized, "after determination that if the plaintiff prevails, there is no rea-
sonable likelihood that recovery will exceed one thousand dollars," to 
transfer any tort or contract action to an appropriate District Court 
for trial by a full-time justice. A party aggrieved by a District Court 
finding may have the case retransferred to the Superior Court where 
the District Court finding will be entitled to prima facie weight. The 
following table shows the results of the Transfer Act through June 30, 
1959. It should be read with the realization that it includes about two 
thousand cases which were already on the docket of the Superior Court 
on September 1, 1958, when the Transfer Act became effective. 
Remanded from 
Superior Court 
Tried in District 
Courts 
Retransferred to 
Superior Court 
Pending in District 
Courts 
TABLE IV 
Transfer Act Cases 
District Courts (Other than 
Boston Municipal Court) 
3,788 
816 
266 
1,310 
Boston 
Municipal Court 
1,342 
365 
95 
655 
§21.6. 1 Acts of 1958, c. 5(;9, §2, inserting C.L., c. 251, §102C. See 1958 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §25.6. 
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§21.7. Three-judge panels in labor matters. Chapter 600 of the 
Acts of 1959, a broadly drawn statute, requires the convening of a 
panel of three associate justices of the Superior Court to preside at 
hearings upon applications for injunctions in labor disputes and also 
at trials of other types of employer-employee controversies_ 
C. THE DISTRICT COURTS 
§21.8. The full-time District Court system. During the 1959 SUR-
VEY year, the presiding justices of the Newton District Court and the 
Second District Court of Plymouth at Hingham and Abington were 
made full-time judges.1 The Second District Court of Barnstable sit-
ting at Provincetown and Harwich was added to the courts whose ma-
jor civil cases must be tried by a full-time justice,2 thus leaving the 
District Courts at Nantucket and Edgartown on Martha's Vineyard as 
the only District Courts not included in the full-time system. 
§21.9. District Court business. The business of the District Courts, 
other than the Boston Municipal Court, is shown in the following 
table. 
TABLE v 
District Court Business (Other than 
Boston Municipal Court) 
1955-56 1956-57 1957-58 1958-59 
Civil writs entered 73,868 75,993 79,817 73,988 
Removals to the 
Superior Court 13,569 14,409 16,100 7,020 
Criminal cases begun 201,730 223,760 236,519 242,208 
Small claims 68,153 68,546 68,281 68,192 
Juveniles under 17 8,169 9,204 10,235 9,153 
Parking tickets 
returned 751,606 817,488 865,912 798,983 
The 1958-1959 reductions in the numbers of civil writs entered and 
removals to the Superior Court can be attributed to the repeal, effec-
tive September 1, 1958, of the Fielding Act, which had required all 
motor tort actions to be started in a District Court. Despite these 
reductions, there was a net increase of over 3000 civil cases, exclusive 
of Transfer Act cases, remaining in the District Court. 
. §21.10. Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. Experi-
ence with the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act is 
shown in the following table. 
§21.8. 1 Acts of 1959, ee. 568 (Newton), 586 (Plymouth). 
2 Id., c. 77. 
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TABLE VI 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act Cases 
1956-57 1957-58 
Number of cases 
initiated 826 977 
Number of cases re-
ceived from other 
states 345 396 
1958-59 
1,070 
456 
Amount collected $601,371 $822,163 $1,018,258 
§21.11. Six-member juries. For the past two years, six-member 
juries have heard cases, upon consent of the parties, in the Central 
District Court of Worcester_ During this period, 635 such cases were 
entered and 90 were tried to a verdict. Of these, 55 verdicts were for 
the plaintiff and 35, of which 4 were directed verdicts, were for the 
defendant. There were 100 cases pending as of June 30, 1959. The 
largest verdict was for $5525 in a contract action for services. 
The six-member jury appears to have gained the acceptance of the 
Worcester bar. Originally established on a two-year temporary basis 
until June 30, 1959,1 the legislature in 1959 extended the use of this 
jury until June 30, 1961.2 
D. JUDICIAL PENSIONS 
§2 l.l 2. Earnings after retirement for disability. As the result of 
a referendum in 1958, "Every person other than a judge" who is gain-
fully occupied after retirement "under any general or special law for 
disability" was required to credit his earnings above a prescribed 
amount against his pension.1 The exemption of judges from this re-
quirement was due, at least in part, it seems, to the constitutional pro-
vision which prohibits the "compensation" of judges from being the 
subject of a referendum.2 
The 1959 legislature sought to put judges on the same footing as 
others by striking out the judicial exemption in the language quoted 
above.3 But it is extremely doubtful, both by way of statutory con-
struction and constitutional law, whether the legislature succeeded in 
its aim. Retirement of judges for disability is not made "under any 
general or special law" but rather under Article LVIII of the Amend-
ments to the Constitution, which makes judicial retirements for dis-
ability "subject to any provisions made by law as to pensions or allow-
§21.11. 1 Acts of 1956, c. 738, §§IA, 14. 
2 Acts of 1959, c. 277. 
§21.12. 1 Acts of 1958, c. 684, §1, amending C.L., c. 32, §91A. 
2 Mass. Const. Amend. Art. XLVIII, Pt. 2, §2. 
3 Acts of 1959, c. 504. 
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ances payable to such officers upon their voluntary retirement." No 
provision of the law respecting a judge's voluntary retirement requires 
him to credit any post-retirement earnings against his pension.4 It 
would therefore seem to be beyond the power of the legislature to at-
tach such a condition to the pension of a judge retired for disability 
as long as the pensions of judges who retire voluntarily are not subject 
to a like condition . 
.. G.L •• c. 32. §§65A. 65B. 
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